Winckler’s “Institutionalism and Participation on Taiwan, From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism” focuses on political transition in Taiwan in the first half of the 1980s. He characterizes the KMT regime as “gerontocratic-authoritarian”, arguing that this regime was undergoing a generational succession from a waishengren to benshengren leadership, and systemic transition from “hard” to “soft” authoritarianism. “Hard” authoritarianism meant mainlander technocratic rule under a one-man dictatorship. The primary function of elections was to co-opt local elites, and the regime was secured through extra-constitutional security police. Soft authoritarianism implies joint waishengren/ benshengren collective party rule, and while the primacy of the party is maintained, more open and competitive elections are allowed. Soft authoritarianism is better adapted to absorbing new social forces created by Taiwan’s rapid economic growth and modernization, and reduces the need of the party to resort to direct repression to secure its rule. (pp. 482-483) Responding to criticism that his “hard” and “soft” authoritarianism model forced a dualistic understanding of regime type, in a later essay Winckler clarifies his approach identifying varying mixes of “hard” and “soft” elements (see “Regime Type and Regime Change on Taiwan: Some Conceptual Issues and Comparative Implications”).
Winckler argues that authoritarian transition is carried out through three types of relationships: institutionalisation and participation, external and internal relations, and formal and informal arrangements. Of these, institutionalism and participation is the most important. According to Huntington, during a process of social change, maintenance of political power requires the balancing the capability of state institutions and the volume of mass political mobilization (political participation). In fact, the demand for political participation has probably grown less than the “participation crisis” would expect as economic growth has strengthen regime legitimacy and absorbed the energies of the masses. Taiwan’s political leadership have also proved good at adapting political institutions to absorb and selectively suppress demand from society. The relationship between participation and political development is also constrained by Taiwan’s global economic and geopolitical position as well as Taiwan’s Chinese cultural heritage. Winckler argues that “Taiwan is an extraordinarily conservative regime; it is also an extraordinarily successful one.” In the early 1980s the KMT regime was far from collapse, and Chiang Ching-kuo’s reforms in fact led to its rejuvenation. (pp. 483-485)
The formal system combines Leninist (the party), presidential (The “Temporary Provisions”), and parliamentary (the 1947 constitution) elements. Informally, these arrangements can be grouped into three “sectors”: legitimation, security, and development. (p. 485)
The three key leadership positions are the KMT chairman, president, and premier. The party chairman is the most important position, and is normally filled by the president. However, the succession of Chiang Ching-kuo to the presidency reveals the flexibility of the system. The Leader can manipulate institutions to concentrate or disperse power. (pp. 485-488)
The core of the legitimation sector is the ruling party. The sector upholds state values such as nationalism, anti-communism, and developmentalism. The single most important post within the party is sectary-general (秘書長), responsible for managing the flow of issues and proposals to the Leader. The core of state power is the web of internal and external security agencies. Both military and police are professionally separate from domestic politics and subordinated to civilian leadership. The developmental sector is the web of government agencies that manage the economy. Like other countries, the main tension is between more investment orientated organizations and revenue orientated organizations. (pp. 488-491)
Winckler argues that informal processes of group incorporation and individual participation are probably more important to Taiwan’s political stability than formal elections. Each institutional sector contains mass organizations that incorporate particular social groups (for example the China Youth Corps and the Women’s Association), partly representing their interests but also pre-empting the development of alternative groups. Although these mass organizations may constrain mass participation as much as they facilitate it, at least they provide a channel for communication between the ordinary citizen and the state. In addition, people have contacts within the political and economic establishment deriving from personal networks. They are therefore more likely to pursue their individual interests by private means rather than collective lobbying. Elections also pose a dilemma for the party. On the one hand, to maintain its core “one China” ideology and placate powerful elite mainlanders, it must maintain strong mainlander representation. On the other hand, it also needs to meet demands for greater political participation from Taiwanese. The response of the government was to the formal institutions intact, but slowly allow a degree of informal liberalization. (pp. 492-496)
Tags: Democratization, Edwin A. Winckler, hard authoritarianism, Institutionalism and Participation on Taiwan, soft authoritarianism, Taiwan
