Kung I-chun’s (龔宜君) study of the formation of the KMT’s social basis tries to move beyond approaches which emphasise the autonomy of the state. Instead she argues that state autonomy is not given, and that to understand the development of the KMT’s social basis in the period after the party reorganization we need to look at the interaction between state and society. By shifting the focus from an autonomous state onto society, Kung also shows how the relationship between the state and society was radically different across different sectors. (pp. 1-17)
Kung offers the following points as a basis for her analysis.
(1) The survival of the modern state is dependent on carrying out the following functions within society: protection, extraction, and production.
(2) The organs of the modern state aim for direct control and penetration of society to avoid power and political objectives becoming distorted by agents at the local level.
(3) The state, within its specific historical context, does not face a uniform society. (pp. 17-19)
The KMT regime was a Leninist party state. The party operated cells in both government organs and military divisions. The government maintained control over the economy through ownership of public enterprises, which in 1949 accounted for 72.5% of total industrial production. The also government used economic planning and controls to exert its dominance. (pp. 20-24)
Kung offers the following propositions:
(1) The émigré party-state regime showed uneven control and penetration of society.
(2) The varying ability of the regime to penetrate different parts of society is closely related the particular characteristics of the party-state regime. Penetration of mainlander groups was much more effective than that of native Taiwanese.
(3) The varying penetration capabilities of special party branches and regional party branches is reflected in the formation of the party’s social base and state-society relations. (pp. 30-34)
Having suffered defeat on the mainland and facing major economic and political problems on Taiwan, the party undertook a major reorganization. Some of the economic and political issues included political instability in Taiwan, international isolation, runaway inflation, a shortage of foreign exchange, and insufficient production. The regime’s major policy directions were as follows: Leninist party-state, the Temporary Provisions and martial law, maintain vast military, obtain US aid, large public sector and state economic planning, and import-substitution industrialization. (pp. 37-42)
The KMT reorganization broke the powerful factions from the mainland period. At the start of the reorganization, Chiang Kai-shek froze the Party Central Committee (中央黨部) which was under control of Chen Lifu (陳立夫) and brother Chen Guofu’s (陳果夫) CC clique. The 16 member Central Reform Committee (中央改造委員會) under his personal control became the highest decision making body in the party, taking over the functions of the unwieldy 460 member Central Committee. All 16 members of the Central Reform Committee had close personal relations with Chiang Kai-shek. Important figures from the mainland period including Yan Xishan (閻錫山), He Yingqin (何應欽), Sun Ke (孫科), and Bai Chongxi (白崇禧) were excluded from power. The aim was to create a unified system of central control centred on the Chiang family. Reorganization was completed at all levels of the party, overseen by committees in local and special party branches. (pp. 43-45)
One of the key objectives of reorganization was to penetrate local society. After 228, the party was in a weak position with its original 52200 members in Taiwan reduced to only 25000. Attracting more party members was regarded as vital. The party was essentially divided into 3 levels. The party centre was responsible for formulating policy and issuing orders, the provincial/county level acted as a supervisor, and the district level formed cells which undertook party work. The district party branch (區黨部) was divided into a number of sub-branches (區分部) At the lowest level, members were divided into party small groups (小組). The structure basically copied the party’s 1924 reorganization. The main difference was that small groups became much more important, ensuring that members remained active in the party, and working as cells to penetrate society. (pp. 46-48) Leninist party organization called for the formation of party branches at the workplace which could then penetrate every aspect of a worker’s life. However, because Taiwan was still a mainly agricultural society, there was also a need to form party branches in each district. In fact special party branches were not only formed at the workplace, but were also based on distinct groups within society – for example the “Intellectual Youth Branch” (知識青年黨部). (pp. 48-55) By 1952, the party had created a comprehensive network of party branches and small groups. However, district party branches had much more difficulty attracting members – around 60% of members belonged to special branches. In addition, party membership was still dominated by mainlanders who made up around 70% of the total. (pp. 55-70)
In the third, fourth and fifth chapters, Kung discusses how the special party branches acted as an “organizational weapon” for the Leninist KMT. The party penetrated every aspect of the lives of special branch party members. In order to ensure the loyalty of the membership of party special branches to the regime, and prevent them from joining forces with local factions, many important party members were “isolated” from wider society.
The special party branch (特種黨部) was organized organized within the military. The Huang Fuxing (黃復興) party branch was organized for military veterans. Soldiers and their dependants lived within separate communities (眷村). The party was therefore able to exercise of a dominant position over soldiers, retired soldiers and their dependants. A majority of retired soldiers were allocated jobs by the regime after leaving the army. It used this position to mobilize support for the regime, which also translated into the so-called “iron votes” (鐵票) at election time. Overall, in 1967 around 430,000 people lived in the dependants villages. Another 80,000 retired soldiers had been allocated work by the party. So a total of approximately 515,000 people lived in communities isolated from Taiwanese society, making up around 28.6% of the total waisheng community in Taiwan. (pp. 71-99)
Public enterprises had a monopoly position in the key sectors of the economy. The party attempted to penetrate workers in public enterprises in order to: (1) Consolidate its control over the allocation of economic resources; (2) Control labour in key industries. Through party control of unions, workers could be mobilized. Because the party branches in public enterprises had control over work units and the career prospects of individual workers, its mobilization at election time was particularly effective. (pp. 101-115)
The party used its Intellectual Youth Branch to school campuses to ensure they did not become the basis for opposition activity and co-opt teachers and students into the party. The China Youth Corps (救國團) controlled military training at schools, and organized various recreation activities, and well as more politically orientated events. Although the corps was officially a state organization, in reality it was run under party direction. (pp. 117-130)
In their attempts to penetrate society and consolidate the power of the centre, the regime faced resistance in peripheral areas. The party established district branches and used agents (benshengren outside their home area, waishengren who spoke Taiwanese) to carry out party work. The party attempted to attempted to link political (政), economic (經), educational (文), and party (黨) structures under one single body (四位一體制). Small groups at the village and township level acted as the party core at the local level. However, the result did not meet expectations. The reason was that agents at the local level were starved of resources and unable to use to party’s power effectively at the local level. The party was forced to rely on unreliable local factions. Agricultural associations were also controlled by local factions and non-farmers. Even after reorganization, agricultural associations remained under control of local factions. (pp. 133-164)
Local elites were wary of outsiders (from different areas or the mainland), meaning that party agents had great difficulty penetrating local society. Because district party branches and special party branches were separated, the former was unable to use the resources of the latter for party mobilization. The party small groups were expected to undertake party work at the local level, but they lacked either the decision making ability, supervisory power, or economic resources to carry out their work effectively. (pp. 165-183)
The party tried to use “service stations” (服務站) in the local community to gain support and consolidate the position of district parties. However, the mobilization capabilities of the service stations proved limited. Many people did not separate state institutions at the local level and the party-run service stations. Even when the service station was able to help individuals, this did not necessarily translate into party support. However, the service stations did allow party workers to come into daily contact with individuals at the local level and enable the party the more effectively monitor local society. (pp. 185-200)
The special party branches were able to directly penetrate their target groups and form patron-client relationships. However, district branches relied on local factions to form linkages with local society. The local factions of course often distorted or simply ignored the preferences of the party.
The mobilization capabilities of the KMT was a key reason for its electoral advantage. It used its organizational resources to control local factions. Kung calculates that the KMT could mobilize an average of 28.7% of votes in elections (13.3% from special party branches and 15.4% from district party branches). Therefore the state was able to select the winning faction at the local level and thereby control the power of factions. From a survey of three elections for provincial assemblymen, Kung finds a close relationship between percentage of votes obtained and number of seats won on the one hand, and mobilization of special party branches on the other. She finds no such relationship with district party branches. (pp. 201-212)
In conclusion, Kung suggests some links between the 1950s and 1990s:
1. The social basis of the special party branches had not dissipated by the 1990s and was still able to mobilize votes. Because of the separation of the waisheng community in terms of geography, profession, and organization, their sense of solidarity and opposition to Taiwan independence remained strong. However the Huang Fuxing votes drifted to the New Party during the 1990s.
2. The party centre and local factions had both conflictual and cooperative relations. These relationships defined local politics in Taiwan for 40 years.
3. Democratization and Taiwanization was the result of contradictions within the party. The entry of factions into the party complicated the patron-client model. By the 1980s, the state was unable to use its resources to control an emerging civil society. (pp. 221-227)
Tags: "Outsider Regime" and Native Society: The Formation of the KMT Regime's Social Basis Following Internal Party Reorganization, 龔宜君, factions, Gong Yijun, KMT, Kung I-chun, Taiwan, waishengren, 外來政權與本土社會
